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NOTE
Education Fraud at the Margins: Using the Federal
False Claims Act to Curb Enrollment Abuses in
Online, For-Profit K–12 Schools
Erin R. Chapman*
America’s online schools have some things to account for. In recent years, an
increase in the number of for-profit K–12 schools has coincided with the rise
of online education. Meanwhile, funding models that award money for each
additional student incentivize for-profit schools to overenroll students in on-
line programs that were once reserved for specialized subsets of students. Al-
though, to date, reported incidents of enrollment fraud have been rare, there
are many reasons to think that the problem has gone largely undetected. As
education reformers on both sides of the political spectrum continue to push
privatization and charter schools, figuring out how to avoid waste and mini-
mize fraud will only become more important. This Note argues that the fed-
eral False Claims Act (FCA) is the best short-term option for curbing this kind
of enrollment-reporting abuse. By drawing an analogy to health-care fraud,
this Note makes the case that prosecutors and individuals can and should use
expanded theories of false claiming to hold accountable online charter schools
that exaggerate their enrollment.
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Introduction
In online charter schools across the country, enrollment numbers are
not adding up. The situation looks something like this: A well-established
education management organization (EMO) partners with a state or local
school district to open a new online charter school. The school aggressively
recruits students away from traditional, brick-and-mortar schools by high-
lighting the flexibility online learning provides. Students and families who
are dissatisfied with their current schools sign up. These students include a
few high achievers and athletes but are mostly students who were overlooked
by or pushed out of traditional schools—among them, students with behav-
ior records and students on the verge of dropping out.
School starts and classes begin. Most students log in and complete all
their classes, but some do not. Others log in only occasionally. On the one
day a year that the state requires the school report its enrollment, the new
school reports that all the students it recruited are enrolled in its program,
including the ones who have only completed a couple of class sessions. Based
on the numbers the school reported, it receives state and federal funding
proportional to the number of qualifying students on the rolls.
A little while later, some of the students who struggled in their physical
school find themselves struggling with their new online school as well—a
few of them even stop logging in all together. Without daily attendance or
teachers to note the absence, the students fall increasingly behind. And with-
out a system in place to track enrollment, the online charter does nothing
either to get the students to log back in or to adjust its reported enrollment
numbers.
That means that a portion of the school’s students have stopped receiv-
ing any educational benefits from the school. But, because the state funding
associated with that student was already disbursed, the online provider con-
tinues to be able to use—and profit from—the funds the state allocated for
the students’ education.
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This scenario has played out in varying degrees in schools across the
country. School district officials in Stockton, California, for example, closed
Renew Virtual Academy in May 2015 after they received information that
the school was overreporting the number of students enrolled in the school
by “roughly double.”1 Two years earlier, a whistleblower at a Pennsylvania
school alleged that an online charter kept one special education student en-
rolled in order to continue receiving state special education funds, despite
the fact that the student missed 140 consecutive days of school.2 Another
whistleblower in Ohio revealed that an online charter school kept 400 truant
students enrolled.3 The recent growth in online schools4 combined with cur-
rent count practices and funding levels make such schools particularly sus-
ceptible to abuse. Despite these concerns, regulators are not currently using
any consistent strategy to deal with enrollment fraud in K–12 online charter
schools.5
This Note explores options to regulate enrollment fraud at online char-
ter schools to ensure that public money spent on online education supports
students and not for-profit providers. This Note begins by providing context
on online charter school enrollment and funding. Part I describes the
unique potential for enrollment fraud in online charter schools and why
such fraud is a problem that deserves the attention of plaintiffs and prosecu-
tors. Part II surveys the federal False Claims Act (FCA) and chronicles the
emergence of expanded theories of FCA liability in the health-care context
1. Elizabeth Roberts, Charter School Dissolves Amid Charges of Nepotism, Fiscal Misman-
agement, Enrollment Fraud, Record (May 2, 2015, 6:07 PM), http://www.recordnet.com/arti
cle/20150502/NEWS/150509921 [https://perma.cc/5EKF-RW7D].
2. Benjamin Herold, Ex-Workers Claim Cyber-Charter Operator Manipulated Enrollment
Figures, Phila. Pub. Sch. Notebook (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:15 AM), http://thenotebook.org/blog/
135532/ex-workers-claim-operator-cyber-charters-played-games-enrollment-figures [https://
perma.cc/Z234-C3TV].
3. Online Charter School Accused of Padding Rolls for School Funding, Columbus Dis-
patch (May 5, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2015/05/05/e-
school-attendance-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/DAN5-2Z2E]. Those allegations were in-
itially dismissed by the then CEO of School Choice in Ohio who later resigned after evidence
surfaced that he had deliberately ignored failing data from several of the state’s online charter
schools, organizations run by campaign donors to his political party. Doug Livingston, Investi-
gation of Ohio Department of Education and Charter-School Oversight Requested by Tom Saw-
yer, Teresa Fedor, Akron Beacon J. (Aug. 27, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.ohio.com/news/
break-news/investigation-of-ohio-department-of-education-and-charter-school-oversight-re
quested-by-tom-sawyer-teresa-fedor-1.619449 [https://perma.cc/B4CH-RS27]. Ohio state sen-
ators called for the reopening of the investigation into the Ohio Virtual Academy’s enrollment
abuses after it became clear that the CEO of School Choice was “in-bed with the industry
during the time of the supposed review.” Id.
4. See infra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
5. See Rosa Pazhouh et al., Ctr. on Reinventing Pub. Educ., The Policy Frame-
work for Online Charter Schools 4–13 (2015), https://www.crpe.org/sites/default/files/
crpe-policy-framework-online-charter-schools-final_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ5J-XVLK]
(cataloguing the disparate ways states regulate online charter schools).
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that have made the statute a more potent waste-fighting tool. Part III ana-
lyzes the only FCA case to date brought against an online charter for enroll-
ment issues and suggests that courts are open to hearing similar cases.
Additionally, Part III argues that plaintiffs and prosecutors could use the
expanded theories of false claiming pioneered in health-care cases to curb
enrollment abuse. After considering and rejecting available alternatives, this
Note concludes that FCA suits represent the best short-term approach to
regulating online charter schools and their for-profit providers.
I. K–12 Online Charter Schools and the Potential for
Enrollment Abuses
Because online charter schools are a relatively recent innovation, this
Part begins by providing some background on how they operate and why
their funding structure makes them particularly vulnerable to abuse. After
that, it explains why the K–12 education context makes it particularly im-
portant that enrollment fraud at online schools be stopped as soon as
possible.
Online charter schools allow K–12 students enrolled in public school
districts to take classes online.6 As public charter schools, these schools re-
ceive funding from local, state, and federal governments7 but operate under
a “charter,” or contract, from an authorizing board, which allows the
schools to exist for a specified amount of time provided they meet certain
predetermined benchmarks.8 Even though their futures are inherently un-
certain, charter schools offer founders and school districts an attractive
tradeoff: the school district does not have to commit to funding the school
indefinitely in exchange for providing the school leaders more control over
the direction of the school.9 Since charters do not have to comply with all of
the regulations that plague traditional public schools, they theoretically have
more opportunities to innovate.10
6. See, e.g., Cyber Charter Schools, REACH Found., http://www.paschoolchoice.org/
school-choice/cyber-charter-schools/ [https://perma.cc/N34L-T8K2]. For clarity, this Note
uses the phrase “online charter schools” to refer to schools that deliver instruction to students
remotely using computers. Other authors talk about “cyber” or “virtual” schools. When I say
“online” schools, I mean to include these other schools as well.
7. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 10 Facts About K-12 Education Funding 2, 7 (2005)
[hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 10 Facts], https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/
10facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4X8-QMS3].
8. See, e.g., Paul Kim et al., Public Online Charter School Students: Choices, Perceptions,
and Traits, 49 Am. Educ. Res. J. 521, 524 (2012).
9. See Michael Mintrom & Sandra Vergari, Charter Schools as a State Policy Innovation:
Assessing Recent Developments, 29 St. & Loc. Gov’t Rev. 43, 44–45 (1997) (discussing how
charter schools, as autonomous and independent bodies, have more latitude for innovation
than traditional public schools).
10. See id.
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Generally, schools are funded on a per-pupil basis according to a fund-
ing formula set by the state or local government.11 That means that each
additional student who enrolls increases the school’s revenue and, depend-
ing on the formula used, certain groups of students—often low-income and
special education students—bring more revenue for the school.12 Although
schools are funded in the United States primarily on a local basis, K–12
schools also receive funding from the federal government, generally in the
form of money for special education or Title I funds.13
Online charters allow their students to access the curriculum over the
internet, sometimes through synchronous instruction—instruction happen-
ing in real time—and other times through prerecorded lessons.14 Occasion-
ally, students complete lessons at a school building, but most often they do
so in their own homes, interacting with instructors only online or over the
phone. Much of the draw of online learning is flexibility.15 This flexibility
makes online learning a natural fit for certain categories of students: elite
11. See Educ. Law Ctr., Funding, Formulas, and Fairness 5–6 (2013), http://
www.elc-pa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ELC_schoolfundingreport.2013.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2LP3-YCPL] (summarizing different factors states use in their enrollment formulas).
State funding ranges between about $6,500 to $19,800 per pupil. See Emma Brown, The States
that Spend the Most (and the Least) on Education, in One Map, Wash. Post (June 2, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/06/02/the-states-that-spend-the-most-
and-the-least-on-education-in-one-map/?utm_term=.24f671f8e83c [https://perma.cc/DP5A-
X8EQ]. About 10 percent of a school district’s funding comes from federal, as opposed to state
or local, funds. See How Much Money Does Our School District Receive from Federal, State, and
Local Sources?, Data First, http://www.data-first.org/data/how-much-money-does-our-
school-district-receive-from-federal-state-and-local-sources/ [https://perma.cc/24T2-PGXD].
For example, in 2012 the New York City School District received $23,517,452 total in funding,
$2,237,047 of which came from the federal government. Stephen Q. Cornman, Nat’l Ctr.
for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., NCES 2014-303, Revenues and Expenditures
for Public Elementary and Secondary School Districts: School Year 2011–12 (Fiscal
Year 2012), at 7 tbl.3 (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2014/2014303.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AV8R-6ECH].
12. See, e.g., Understanding State School Funding, Progress Educ. Reform (Educ.
Comm’n of the States, Denver, Colo.), June 2012, at 1, 5, http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/01/
02/86/10286.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5TZ-22UV]. Compare Maria Millard & Stephanie Ar-
agon, Educ. Comm’n of the States, State Funding for Students with Disabilities 2
(2015), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/01/19/47/11947.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT5Q-
U2FM] (“Thirty three states and the District of Columbia provide money for students with
disabilities through their primary funding formula. Adjustments for students with disabilities
are multiplied by the base funding amount—an amount deemed sufficient for general educa-
tion students to meet state standards.”), with 50-State Comparison, Educ. Comm’n States,
http://ecs.force.com/mbdata/mbfundallf?rep=SBFAF [https://perma.cc/LQ26-EMD7] (listing
state funding formulas, including formulas that include multipliers or weights that result in
additional funding for students with disabilities).
13. See U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 10 Facts, supra note 7, at 4. Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act provides additional funds to schools that enroll high numbers of
low-income students. Improving Basic Programs Operated by Local Educational Agencies (Title I,
Part A), U.S. Dep’t Educ., https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html?exp=0
[https://perma.cc/SJE3-SZU9].
14. See Kim, supra note 8, at 524–30.
15. See id.
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athletes with demanding training schedules, rural students seeking a wider
variety of courses, and high achievers wanting access to more rigorous
material.16
Since 2000, the number of online schools operating in the United States
has ballooned.17 These schools now enroll many different kinds of students.18
Today, it is much more common for online schools to target struggling stu-
dents on the verge of dropping out19—a demographic that research shows is
often not at all well served by the self-driven model of online learning.20
Beyond serving a more diverse pool of students, online schools now also
serve many more students. In fact, in 2011, nine for-profit companies ran
online K–12 schools that collectively enrolled almost 200,000 full-time stu-
dents.21 One study estimated that there were 311 full-time virtual schools
enrolling students during the 2011–2012 school year.22 To date, thirty states
and the District of Columbia permit full-time virtual schools to enroll and
educate students.23
Online charter schools cost significantly less to run than their brick-
and-mortar counterparts because they generally do not incur the costs asso-
ciated with a physical building, and one instructor can deliver a lesson to a
virtually unlimited number of students.24 Even so, most states currently fund
online charter schools at the same level as traditional public schools.25 While
the start-up costs associated with investing in online technology are signifi-
cant,26 online schools, once established, are able to make more money for
each additional student that they enroll with very few marginal costs.27 This
potential profit margin makes the schools attractive to educational manage-
ment organizations, or EMOs, that have already invested in the technology
16. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online Charter Schools, N.Y. Times






21. Id. (“In all, for-profit educational management companies run 79 online schools
around the country.”).
22. Gary Miron et al., Full-Time Virtual Schools: Enrollment, Student Characteristics, and
Performance, in Virtual Schools in the U.S. 2013: Politics, Performance, Policy and
Research Evidence 22, 24 (Alex Molnar ed., 2013), http://nepc.colorado.edu/files/nepc-vir
tual-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4Z5-3L2L].
23. Id.
24. See Saul, supra note 16.
25. Id.
26. Educ. Tech. Coop., S. Reg’l Educ. Bd., Cost Guidelines for State Virtual
Schools: Development, Implementation and Sustainability 4 (2006), http://publica
tions.sreb.org/2006/06T03_Virtual_School_Costs.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ84-EXTN] (“Al-
though the first several years require greater funding, economies of scale should benefit states
in funding state virtual schools over time.”).
27. Id.
February 2018] Education Fraud at the Margins 651
necessary to deliver the curriculum.28 As a result, online charter schools,
particularly ones run by EMOs, have an incentive to recruit additional stu-
dents aggressively, often without considering whether those students are well
suited for online learning—which requires much more self-motivation and
parental involvement than traditional classroom learning.29
Given these factors, it is unsurprising that, as enrollment at online char-
ter schools has increased, incidents of enrollment abuses have also grown.30
The most egregious example of this growing fraud involved Renew Virtual
Academy in California.31 There, auditors determined that the school had
overreported its enrollment by almost double.32 Although incidents this ex-
treme are rare, it highlights how the growth of online charter schools offers
opportunities for enterprising CEOs and EMOs to exploit taxpayers. Because
for-profit online providers have incentives to enroll more students to receive
more profits, this problem will only get worse as more providers enter the
market.33
This potential for abuse would be troubling in any public-sector pro-
gram. But the fact that it exists in K–12 education makes it even more con-
cerning, because paying for K–12 education services that are not actually
delivered is bad for taxpayers, students, and society. Of course, when the
state and federal governments pay out tax dollars to schools for students
who rarely log in, the government wastes money. And since here the wasted
funds translate into revenue for the for-profit providers, the waste is even
more troubling.34 Not to mention that when students do not log in to com-
plete their lessons, they do not make progress toward meeting the baseline
expectations for their grade level,35 do not learn the required material, and
28. EMOs are companies that administer the online curriculum on behalf of the district.
See Gary Miron & Charisse Gulsino, Nat’l Educ. Policy Ctr., Profiles of For-Profit
and Nonprofit Education Management Operations: Fourteenth Edition (2011–2012),
at 2 (2013). During the 2011–2012 school year, more than 800 public schools that together
enrolled more than 460,000 students were run by for-profit EMOs. Id. at iii–iv. Of those
schools managed by for-profit EMOs, 10.8 percent of them were online schools. Id. at iii.
29. See Saul, supra note 16.
30. See, e.g., supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
31. See Roberts, supra note 1.
32. Id. In addition to the enrollment violations, the CEO hired relatives, sometimes with-
out disclosing their relationship. Id. The CEO even hired her son—whose resume listed expe-
rience as a manager at a bar, a Chili’s restaurant, and a Sprint store—as deputy executive
director, paid him $96,000 a year, and allowed him to telecommute two weeks per month
from his home in Colorado. Bank statements showed that grant funds given to the school were
spent on airplane tickets, hotels, and restaurants. Id.
33. See Saul, supra note 16.
34. See id.
35. Online charter school students do not make nearly the same amount of progress as
their counterparts in brick-and-mortar schools. See Miron et al., supra note 22, at 31 (“In the
2010–2011 school year, there was a 28 percentage point difference between full-time virtual
schools meeting [adequate yearly progress] and traditional brick-and-mortar district and char-
ter schools that did: 23.6% compared with 52% respectively.”). Of course, adequate yearly
progress is not a perfect measure of academic performance, but it still highlights a concerning
difference between online schools and their brick-and-mortar counterparts.
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are consequently more likely to drop out.36 Even for those students who beat
the odds and graduate, their schools are sending them out into the world
without the skills necessary to be productive citizens.37 This is especially
problematic given that online charter schools often serve vulnerable stu-
dents,38 including students who have been expelled or pushed out of tradi-
tional schools because of poor behavior.39
Failing to adequately educate online-school students hurts not only the
students themselves but also their communities and society at large. Stu-
dents who graduate unprepared for college or careers weaken the workforce,
which hurts the economy.40 And if you take seriously the idea that in a de-
mocracy mandatory public education exists in part to produce an educated
electorate,41 online charter schools are bad for democracy, too. All of which
is to say that it is important—both for individual students and families, as
well as for communities and society at large—that regulators find a way to
stop online charter schools from overenrolling and then undereducating
36. See, e.g., Donald J. Hernandez, Double Jeopardy: How Third-Grade Reading
Skills and Poverty Influence High School Graduation 4 (2012), https://www.aecf.org/
m/resourcedoc/AECF-DoubleJeopardy-2012-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX3M-78HE] (dis-
cussing how students who fall behind grade level in reading are more likely not to graduate
from high school).
37. Cf. Catherine Gewertz, Only 8 Percent of Students Complete College- and Career-Ready
Curriculum, Educ. Week: High Sch. & Beyond (Apr. 5, 2016, 6:48 AM), http://blogs.edweek.
org/edweek/high_school_and_beyond/2016/04/only_8_percent_of_students_complete_college
_or_career_ready_curriculum.html [https://perma.cc/EV98-EBDW] (“Only 8 percent of U.S.
high school graduates complete a curriculum that prepares them well for college and the
workplace. Even fewer complete those course sequences with grades that would suggest they
mastered the content.”).
38. See Saul, supra note 16. Although online schools in general serve fewer economically
disadvantaged students than brick-and-mortar schools, some online schools target low-income
communities because in many states those students bring with them larger subsidies from state
governments. See id.
39. See, e.g., Step Up Program, http://backontrack.education/step-up-program/ [https:/
/perma.cc/AUN8-DKA4] (“Step Up will also enroll . . . students expelled from other
schools . . . .”).
40. Kelsey Sheehy, High School Students Not Prepared for College, Career, U.S. News
(Aug. 22, 2012, 8:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/high-school-notes/2012/
08/22/high-school-students-not-prepared-for-college-career [https://perma.cc/BU2W-JG6L];
cf. Douglas N. Harris et al., Education and the Economy Revisited: How Schools Matter, 79
Peabody J. Educ. 36, 39 (2004) (discussing how education impacts worker productivity).
41. See Mary Marcy, Democracy, Leadership, and the Role of Liberal Education, Liberal
Educ., Winter 2002, at 6, 8 (“The importance of education is implicit in the history of democ-
racy itself. Some of the earliest philosophers, Plato and Aristotle among them, shared a con-
cern (born of elitism as much as intellect) about rule by those deemed less qualified to make
decisions—the mob, the unpropertied, the poor. Over time, these concerns were muted by an
understanding of the larger conditions necessary for a just democracy, including . . . the over-
arching need for an educated citizenry. For if such decisions as affairs of state are to be left
directly to citizens or their elected representatives, the need for citizens to be educated assumes
profound importance. Education in this vision of democracy calls on the classical notion of an
informed citizenry—individuals who are able to think, reason, analyze, and reflect with dis-
crimination and care.”).
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these marginal students.42 To date, though, no consistent strategy has been
employed.
II. Expanded Notions of What Constitutes a “False Claim”
Under the FCA Have Helped Curb Other Kinds of Waste
Outside the K–12 enrollment context, the federal government is quite
good at smoking out fraud. This Part examines the FCA and how litigators
in other contexts have used it to stop the misuse of federal funds. After
giving an overview of the FCA, this Part discusses the recent expansion of
what counts as a legally false claim under the FCA, particularly in health-
care cases. It does this to illustrate the potential the FCA has to provide a
solution to the growing enrollment-fraud problem.
A. The FCA Allows Prosecutors and Plaintiffs to Hold Accountable People
Who Make “False Claims” for Federal Funds
The FCA subjects government contractors who fraudulently receive fed-
eral funds to civil liability.43 Federal prosecutors rely on the provision to
curb the abuse of federal funds in programs ranging from Medicaid to disas-
ter assistance.44 In 2016, the Department of Justice recovered $4.7 billion
dollars from settlements and judgments brought under the Act.45
42. I mean “marginal students” in the economics sense. I’m assuming that there is a
group of students who would always opt to take their classes online irrespective of whether a
school aggressively recruits them or not; there is another group of students who would not
consider online learning if they weren’t recruited by an online school, but are nevertheless well
suited to it, or at least not any less well suited to it than they are to learning in a traditional
classroom. The students I’m concerned about here are the students at the margins: the stu-
dents who are poorly suited to online learning, but nevertheless enroll in an online program
because they were aggressively recruited by an online school.
43. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012). Originally enacted during the Civil War, the Act
served as the first widespread check on military contractors who defrauded the Union army.
See Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Comment, Reining in Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Implied
Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 227, 236 (2013).
As the federal bureaucracy grew in the twentieth century, the scope and impact of the FCA
grew as well. See id. at 229.
44. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Bil-
lion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016
[https://perma.cc/PEJ3-NW4B] (“The False Claims Act is the government’s primary civil rem-
edy to redress false claims for government funds and property under government programs
and contracts relating to such varied areas as health care, defense and national security, food
safety and inspection, federally insured loans and mortgages, highway funds, small business
contracts, agricultural subsidies, disaster assistance, and import tariffs.”).
45. Id. In 2016, 702 qui tam suits were filed, averaging out to 13.5 new cases filed each
week. Id.
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Through a qui tam, or citizen-suit, provision,46 the Act empowers
whistleblowers to bring actions on behalf of the government.47 The Act in-
centivizes this kind of whistleblowing by (1) shielding whistleblowers from
retaliatory employment actions and (2) allowing successful plaintiffs to re-
ceive between 15 and 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settle-
ment.48 Owing in part to these provisions, roughly 88 percent of FCA claims
are brought as qui tam suits.49
Qui tam plaintiffs must satisfy several requirements to make out a suc-
cessful claim for FCA liability. The plaintiff must prove that the defendant
(1) “present[ed], or cause[ed] to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval” and (2) did so “knowingly.”50 Under the Act a “claim”
includes “any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for
money or property.”51 In addition, to be successfully sued under the act, the
defendant must be a “person.”52 Even though no definition of “person” is
provided in the text of the statute, 53 the Supreme Court has found that
corporations and municipalities are covered persons, but state governments
are not.54 To prevent overzealous claiming, the Act also requires that the
plaintiff be the “original source” of the information on which the action is
based.55 FCA actions are fundamentally fraud actions, so FCA plaintiffs must
meet the higher pleading standard of the Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 9(b) to survive a motion to dismiss.56 All things considered, though,
46. Qui tam provisions allow individual plaintiffs in civil suits to sue both on their own
behalf and on behalf of the government to enforce the provisions of a statute. See Evan
Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 Yale L.J. 341, 341 (1989).
47. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
48. See id. § 3730(d), (h).
49. See Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics—Overview (2013), http:/
/www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2013/12/26/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F7XS-88SA].
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Per the terms of the act, a defendant acts “knowingly” when
they have “actual knowledge,” “ac[t] in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the
information,” or “reckless[ly] disregard the truth or falsity of the information.” Id.
§ 3729(b)(1).
51. Id. § 3729(b)(2).
52. Id. § 3729.
53. See id.
54. Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Construction and Application of False Claims Act—Su-
preme Court Cases, 37 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 543, §§ 10–11 (2009); see also Cook County v. United
States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119 (2003); Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
55. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
56. Martin Merritt & Rachel V. Rose, Pleading “Healthcare Fraud and Abuse” Under the
False Claims Act: Surviving Rule 9(b) and Rule 12(b) (6) Motions to Dismiss, Fed. Law., May
2013, at 62, 64 (“It is well established that the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b)
applies to claims brought under the FCA.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To satisfy Rule 9(b),
the plaintiff must “include plausible factual allegations as to each link of the 31 U.S.C. § 3729
chain.” Merritt & Rose, supra, at 66. Generally, this means that plaintiffs are required to show
either “presentment” or the “materiality” of specific statements as well as evidence that the
pleader has direct knowledge that the claims were presented. Id.
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the FCA is a powerful tool that plaintiffs and prosecutors can use to prevent
public funds from being wasted.
B. Notions of What Is an Actionable “False Claim” Under the
FCA Have Recently Expanded
Recently, courts have shown a willingness to hear FCA suits brought on
increasingly expansive theories of liability. This trend has the potential to
make the FCA an even more powerful tool for fighting fraud. In particular,
courts are broadening conceptions of what counts as a “false claim” under
the FCA. In the health-care context, specifically, courts have allowed plain-
tiffs to proceed to trial on theories of false claiming that put pressure on
traditional understandings of what constitutes fraud. This Section discusses
three theories of what counts as a legally false claim: false certification, im-
plied certification, and worthless services. Whereas under traditional theo-
ries of fraud, a defendant would be held liable only if she made deliberate
misrepresentations in the claim she submitted, these theories make it so
providers can be held liable for something closer to negligence. These theo-
ries of liability, this Note argues, offer a solution to the enrollment-abuse
problem.
1. The False Certification Theory
The typical argument that a defendant is liable under a false certification
theory of FCA liability goes like this: The provider submitted a “false claim”
when its representative signed a form before the funds were disbursed. That
form indicated that by signing, the provider agreed to comply with all fed-
eral regulations. That claim was legally false, the argument goes, if the pro-
vider knew it was in violation of federal regulations at the time of signing.57
This kind of claim is factually false and the rationale for imposing this kind
of liability is straightforward: the government only disbursed the money be-
cause the organization certified that they would comply with the relevant
federal regulations. In other words, the organization lied when it took fed-
eral funds while simultaneously—and knowingly—breaking federal
regulations.
57. Keith D. Barber et al., Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent Developments in
False Claims Act Litigation, 1 Ind. Health L. Rev. 131, 137 (2004). Occasionally, courts will
apply a limited version of this theory, “finding it applicable only ‘when certification is a pre-
requisite to obtaining a government benefit.’ ” Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Hopper v.
Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996)). For example, in United States ex rel. Hopper v.
Anton, the Ninth Circuit concluded that under the FCA “the false certification of compliance
. . . creates liability when certification is a prerequisite to obtaining a government benefit.” 91
F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996); see also United States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA
Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here the government has condi-
tioned payment of a claim upon a claimant’s certification of compliance with, for example, a
statute or regulation, a claimant submits a false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely
certifies compliance with that statute or regulation.”).
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Plaintiffs have had success bringing these suits against for-profit colleges
and universities.58 Given the widespread use of federal Pell Grants and feder-
ally subsidized loans that colleges and universities distribute, institutions of
higher education regularly submit claims for public funds. The amount of
public money channeled into higher education combined with the growing
criticism of for-profit colleges and universities makes it unsurprising that
qui tam plaintiffs have attempted to use the FCA to regulate for-profit
schools.59
In most of these cases, the plaintiff was previously employed at a for-
profit college or university as an “admissions consultant.”60 Consultants are
often the ones to bring FCA actions because Title IV of the Higher Educa-
tion Act bans universities that receive federal funding from financially re-
warding recruiters for enrolling students.61 Generally, the plaintiffs allege
that, notwithstanding the ban, they were paid bonuses for enrolling students
and then falsely certified compliance with federal regulations before receiv-
ing federal funds.62 For-profits are often the target of these kinds of suits
because, given their profit motive, they are seen as more likely to enroll
additional students without concern for whether enrolling is in the students’
best interest.63
2. The Implied Certification Theory
After plaintiffs had success bringing false certification actions, other
plaintiffs attempted to expand liability by bringing actions under an implied
certification theory.64 In these cases, a provider that submits a claim but
58. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Brooks v. Stevens-Henager Coll., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-
00009-BLW, 2015 WL 758988, at *2 (D. Idaho Feb. 23, 2015) (“In many lawsuits against for-
profit colleges, plaintiffs will proceed under a ‘false-certification’ theory.”).
59. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Powell v. Am. InterContinental Univ., Inc., 756 F. Supp.
2d 1374 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (allowing an FCA class action claim to proceed to discovery that was
brought by relators who alleged that that several for-profit colleges and universities had made
false statements in their program-participation agreements that were submitted to the Depart-
ment of Education as a prerequisite to receiving federal student-loan funding).
60. Brooks, 2015 WL 758988, at *2.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(20) (2012) (“The institution will not provide any commission,
bonus, or other incentive payment based directly or indirectly on success in securing enroll-
ments or financial aid to any persons or entities engaged in any student recruiting . . . .”). This
“incentive-compensation ban” exists to lessen the temptation that schools would otherwise
have to enroll marginal students who would bring with them federal funding, even though
those students are not likely to graduate. See Brooks, 2015 WL 758988, at *2.
62. See Brooks, 2015 WL 758988, at *2.
63. See id.
64. See Barber et al., supra note 57, at 137; see, e.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (2016) (“We first hold that, at least in certain circumstances, the
implied false certification theory can be a basis for liability.”); United States ex rel. Augustine v.
Century Health Servs., Inc., 289 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that FCA claims
brought under an implied certification theory can proceed as long as “the contractor knew, or
recklessly disregarded a risk, that its implied certification of compliance was false” (quoting
Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 533 (10th Cir. 2000))); Mikes v. Straus, 274
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does not actually sign a form certifying compliance could still violate the
FCA.65 In other words, the provider could be liable even though it did not
submit a factually false claim. Instead, the theory goes, submitting the claim
implies that the provider affirmed that it was in compliance with the regula-
tions, since violating those regulations would have made it ineligible to re-
ceive the funding.66 Put another way, the fact that the provider submitted
any claim at all when it knew or should have known that it was ineligible to
receive funds because of a violation is what makes the claim legally “false.”
For example, the Sixth Circuit found a holding company for home
health-care agencies liable under the FCA for implicitly certifying compli-
ance.67 The holding company submitted a claim for reimbursements for pay-
ments made to its employee-benefits plan, even though those benefits were
paid back to the provider the next day.68 The court concluded that the pro-
vider’s signed statement accompanying its cost reports, which said that the
reports were “true, correct, and complete” to the best of the signer’s knowl-
edge, was enough for the provider to be liable under the FCA.69 The court
concluded that the company was liable even though the provider did not
explicitly state that, when it signed the statement, it would not transfer the
specific funds.70 This theory has allowed plaintiffs to recover despite the fact
that it stretches the traditional understanding of what counts as a false claim,
but it has not been as successful as often as the false certification theory.71
The Supreme Court recently endorsed this approach in Universal Health Ser-
vices, Inc. v. United States,72 so it is likely that more plaintiffs will rely on this
theory going forward.
3. The Worthless Services Theory
The worthless services theory is a new theory of recovery that puts even
more pressure on what it means to submit a false claim. Under this under-
standing of false claiming, defendants can be liable when the health-care
F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]e think a medical provider should be found to have implic-
itly certified compliance with a particular rule as a condition of reimbursement in limited
circumstances.”); Shaw v. AAA Eng’g & Drafting, Inc., 213 F.3d 519, 531 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]he language and structure of the FCA itself supports the conclusion that, under 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(a)(1), a false implied certification may constitute a ‘false or fraudulent claim.’ ”); Ab-
Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994) (finding the defendant liable
under an implied certification theory).
65. Barber et al., supra note 57, at 137.
66. See id.
67. Augustine, 289 F.3d at 416.
68. Id. at 412, 416.
69. Id. at 414–15.
70. Id. at 415–16.
71. Barber et al., supra note 57, at 137. (“The implied false certification theory has not
been as well received as the false certification theory, and several federal circuit courts have
declined the opportunity to accept it.”).
72. 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016).
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services that they provided was so subpar as to be completely worthless.73 In
these cases, by claiming reimbursement for providing valueless care, the pro-
vider effectively forces the government to pay for nothing—making it so the
provider submits a legally false claim when it asks the government to reim-
burse it for services that have no value.74
In United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
said that it was possible for plaintiffs to state a claim for worthless services
fraud.75 There, a laboratory billed Medicare for tests it had completed using
control samples that it knew fell outside of the acceptable standard of er-
ror.76 Likewise, defendants in a Virginia FCA case settled after the plaintiffs
alleged worthless services fraud where the defendant nursing home had
claimed Medicare benefits while neglecting patients.77
Even though the worthless services theory of liability puts pressure on
the traditional understanding of fraud, it covers a category of deceptive
practices that feel fraudulent. If a provider’s services are so bad that they in
effect have no value, the provider might as well be selling snake oil.
III. The Expanded Theories of False Claiming Should Be Applied
in the Enrollment Context
The health-care fraud cases offer a template for what expanded notions
of false claiming and FCA liability could look like in the K–12 enrollment
context. Assuming that courts will allow FCA suits against charter schools to
proceed to the merits78—and there are good reasons to think that they
73. Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act to Target Overtreat-
ment, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 463, 487–88 (2013); see, e.g., United States ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline
Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In an appropriate case, knowingly billing
for worthless services or recklessly doing so with deliberate ignorance may be actionable under
§ 3729, regardless of any false certification conduct.”); Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 703 (2d
Cir. 2001) (“We agree that a worthless services claim is a distinct claim under the Act. It is
effectively derivative of an allegation that a claim is factually false because it seeks reimburse-
ment for a service not provided.”).
74. Buck, supra note 73, at 487–88. This theory emerged after the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania successfully prosecuted a long-term care facility after
one of its patients was sent to the emergency room and found to be suffering from “26 ulcers,
a gangrenous leg and a series of other serious complications.” Id. (quoting Devin S. Schindler,
Pay for Performance, Quality of Care and the Revitalization of the False Claims Act, 19 Health
Matrix 387, 396–97 (2009)).
75. 245 F.3d at 1053.
76. Id. at 1050.
77. Compare David R. Hoffman, The Role of the Federal Government in Ensuring Quality
of Care in Long-Term Care Facilities, 6 Annals Health L. 147, 148 (1997), with Michael J.
Davidson, Governmental Responses to Elder Abuse and Neglect in Nursing Homes: The Criminal
Justice System and the Civil False Claims Act, 12 Elder L.J. 327, 344 (2004), for a discussion of
United States v. GMS Management-Tucker, Inc., a case that settled after federal prosecutors
brought a suit against a Virginia nursing home that claimed Medicaid benefits while failing to
provide adequate care, including allowing one patient to develop twenty-six bedsores, one of
which was as large as a grapefruit.
78. See infra note 84.
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will79—the health-care cases suggest a theory of false claiming that plaintiffs
and prosecutors should attempt to use to hold accountable charter schools
that exaggerate their enrollments.
This Part starts by analyzing the only case to date that has been brought
in federal court against an online charter school for its alleged enrollment
abuses. Next, it evaluates the potential for future plaintiffs to make out the
case that online charter schools submit legally false claims when they exag-
gerate their enrollments. It ends by arguing that bringing these kinds of
cases is the best short-term approach to stopping enrollment fraud.
A. Minnesota Transitions: Submitting Exaggerated Enrollment Data Could
Constitute a “False Claim”
In 2014, a federal district court indicated for the first time that an FCA
claim against an online charter school that either (at best) lazily tracks or (at
worst) inflates its enrollment data might be able to succeed.80 That case,
United States v. Minnesota Transitions Charter School,81 gives us a glimpse
into how the expanded notions of false claiming pioneered in the health-care
and higher education cases could apply in FCA cases about exaggerated en-
rollment numbers.
In Minnesota Transitions, a former administrator for the special educa-
tion program at an online high school brought an FCA action against the
school alleging that the school knowingly submitted false enrollment data to
the state in order to receive additional funds.82 The court considered three
challenges to the plaintiff’s FCA action,83 but this Note will only discuss one
of them at length here84: Does submitting exaggerated enrollment numbers
to the federal government amount to a “false claim” for FCA purposes?
79. See infra note 84.
80. See United States v. Minn. Transitions Charter Sch., 50 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1108 (D.
Minn. 2014).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1108–09.
83. Id. at 1108.
84. The other two challenges concerned whether charter schools can be sued under the
FCA. Id. The defendant online charter school argued that it could not be sued because (1)
online charter schools are shielded from suit by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity and
(2) online schools are not “persons” within the meaning of the FCA. Id. at 1111. The court
found for the plaintiffs on both questions, concluding that the charter school could be sued
under the FCA. Id. at 1113, 1120, 1122. To come to that conclusion, the court asked whether
online charter schools are the kind of entity that would normally receive sovereign immunity.
See id. at 1114. The court’s answer ultimately turned on its determination that online charter
schools are more like local governments (which can be sued under the FCA) than they are like
wings of the state governments (which cannot be sued under the FCA). See id. at 1114–20.
Another note could be written on whether future courts will consider charter schools to
be entitled to sovereign immunity—and by extension—whether charter schools are appropri-
ate defendants under the FCA. To give an overview, courts are currently split over whether
charter schools are effective enough wings of the state to be entitled to sovereign immunity:
Like the district court in Minnesota, the Supreme Court of California has concluded that
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Specifically, the court considered whether submitting enrollment num-
bers constituted a “false . . . claim for payment or approval” under the
FCA.85 The court held that, because the complaint did not “adequately allege
how [d]efendants’ actions amounted to a false claim for payments or bene-
fits,” the plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.86
The court left open the possibility, however, that if the plaintiffs had clearly
explained how “the relevant funding mechanisms operate and how the alleg-
edly falsified documents and other reports related to those funding mecha-
nisms,” the plaintiffs could have succeeded at alleging that the
“[d]efendants’ actions amounted to a false claim for payments or benefits.”87
certain charter schools operated by independent managers are not entitled to sovereign immu-
nity. See Wells v. One2One Learning Found., 141 P.3d 225, 229 (Cal. 2006). Meanwhile, courts
in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Colorado have concluded that charter schools are entitled to im-
munity. See Preston C. Green, III et al., The Legal Status of Charter Schools in State Statutory
Law, 10 U. Mass. L. Rev. 240, 245 (2015); see also Capacity Builders, Inc. v. Richard Milburn
Acad./Texas, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-1097-RP, 2016 WL 8223266, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2016)
(“Texas charter schools are entitled to immunity . . . .”); King v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d
1056, 1079 (D. Colo. 1999); Warner ex rel. Warner v. Lawrence, 900 A.2d 980, 988 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2006). Even so, Minnesota Transitions is the only case to date to discuss the arm
of the state analysis in the FCA context. See Minn. Transitions, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 1119–20.
Thus, it is possible that even courts in states that have found that charter schools to be wings
of the state for certain purposes could still find them to be independent enough to be sued
under the FCA.
Moreover, there are good reasons to think future courts will follow Minnesota Transitions
and hold that online charter schools in other states are likewise appropriate FCA defendants.
For one thing, the defining feature of charter schools is their independence from state educa-
tion bureaucracies. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. Indeed, charter schools were
initially sold as a grand bargain: they offer school founders less money in exchange for more
control. See, e.g., supra note 9 and accompanying text. Since charters do not have to comply
with all the regulations that plague traditional public schools, the argument goes, charter
schools have more latitude to innovate. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Critics of
education privatization continue to condemn charter schools while supporters laud them as
business-like innovation hubs. Compare Diann Woodard, The Corporate Takeover of Public
Education, Huffington Post (June 6, 2013, 2:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/diann-
woodard/the-corporate-takeover_b_3397091.html [https://perma.cc/P25B-88VZ] (“Unless this
drive to privatize our public schools is arrested, there is little doubt that the largest eight
foundations . . . will succeed in what amounts to a corporate takeover of our public
schools . . . .”), with Presidential Proclamation No. 8815, 77 Fed. Reg. 27555, 27555 (May 7,
2012) (“[C]harter schools serve as incubators of innovation in neighborhoods across our
country.”). It seems reasonable that future courts will conclude that charter schools simply
cannot have it both ways: they cannot separate themselves from the burdens of being a state-
run agency and reap the benefits of independence, only to claim that the protections of the
state when they get sued. Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect that some courts will find that
online charter schools can be sued under the FCA both because (1) sovereign immunity does
not apply to them and (2) they are “persons” for FCA purposes. For these reasons, this Note
assumes that at least some future courts will find that online charter schools are proper FCA
defendants and proceed to evaluate FCA claims on the merits.
85. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (2012); see Minn. Transitions, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 1122. Note
that the claim is that the defendant defrauded the federal government because its submission
of enrollment numbers triggered a disbursement of federal education funds.
86. Minn. Transitions, 50 F. Supp. 3d at 1122.
87. Id.
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In doing so, the court in Minnesota Transitions left a key question unan-
swered: How exactly could future plaintiffs make the case that falsifying en-
rollment numbers is in fact a “false claim” under the FCA? Although no
court has, to date, taken up that question, the health-care fraud cases suggest
possible answers.
B. Under the Expanded Theories, Exaggerating Enrollment Should Be
Considered a “False Claim”
After Minnesota Transitions, there are reasons to be optimistic that fu-
ture courts will allow plaintiffs to make out a case that a provider has sub-
mitted a legally false claim.88 In making that case, prosecutors and qui tam
plaintiffs can and should use the expanded theories of false claiming pio-
neered in the healthcare context.
Plaintiffs could argue, for example, that online charter schools are liable
for exaggerating enrollment numbers under an implied certification89 or
worthless services90 theory of FCA liability. Prosecutors or plaintiffs pro-
ceeding on an implied certification theory against an online charter could
argue that submitting enrollment numbers at all—when school leaders
know that they correspond directly to a pay out from the government—
implies that the school certifies its compliance with the relevant regulations.
In this context, the relevant regulations could include keeping accurate at-
tendance and providing special education services to all students.91 Thus,
online charters who do not keep close track of log-ins and attendance data
could be liable if a court finds that school officials implicitly certified that
they would keep their data current when they made the claim for public
funds.
Alternatively, online charter schools could be liable under a “worthless
services” theory of fraud. The theory would be that keeping students en-
rolled who never log in—while school officials fail to make reasonable ef-
forts to monitor students’ log-ins but nevertheless continue to use the
federal money allocated for educating those students—forces the govern-
ment to in effect pay for “worthless services.” The idea is that claiming fed-
eral funds without simultaneously ensuring that students are even logging
on provides worthless services to students in the same way that providing
88. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89. See supra Section II.B.2.
90. See supra Section II.B.3.
91. See, e.g., Clare McCann, IDEA Funding, EdCentral: Edcyclopedia, http://www.ed
central.org/edcyclopedia/individuals-with-disabilities-education-act-funding-distribution/
[https://perma.cc/YJ2U-AL4U] (discussing the requirement to provide services to students
with special needs); see also Office of Elementary & Secondary Educ., U.S. Dep’t of
Educ., Non-Regulatory Guidance: Local Educational Agency Identification and Se-
lection of School Attendance Areas and School and Allocation of Title I Funds to
Those Areas and Schools (2003), https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/wdag.doc
[https://perma.cc/N4KV-N3W6] (discussing the requirements for schools to receive Title I
funds).
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abysmal care to patients does.92 In other words, if a for-profit provider re-
ceives federal money for delivering instruction to students, at bare mini-
mum, they must have a system in place to make sure that students are
logging in to receive that instruction. Otherwise, they are no better than a
school whose teachers lecture to empty classrooms.93
Not all the theories of liability, however, will translate seamlessly to the
enrollment-fraud context. For example, online charter schools likely cannot
be held liable under the FCA for submitting false claims under a certification
theory. Unlike for-profit colleges and universities, which must certify com-
pliance whenever they submit claims for federal loan money,94 K–12 schools
do not explicitly certify compliance before they receive federal funds for the
qualifying students who they enroll.95 Consequently, claims brought on a
false certification theory of FCA liability will likely fail. Even so, the potential
for liability under the implied certification and worthless services theories of
liability still make the FCA an attractive option.
C. Treating Exaggerated Enrollments as False Claims Is the Best Short-
Term Way to Deter Enrollment Abuses
Using the FCA is not only a viable option for regulating online charters,
but bringing FCA suits against online charter schools that engage in abusive
enrollment practices is a better strategy than the alternatives in the short-
term. Indeed, it is the fastest and most effective way to address this problem
because it does not require legislative or regulatory action.
The major alternatives to bringing FCA actions are (1) state or federal
laws that directly regulate how online school enrollment is counted and
monitored, (2) regulation by the Department of Education, and (3) regula-
tion by the Federal Trade Commission.
Unlike these other alternatives, the FCA allows plaintiffs and prosecu-
tors to take immediate action. Since legislation and administrative actions
take time—often months and years—one of the major benefits of FCA ac-
tions is that individuals and prosecutors could start bringing these suits to-
morrow without any other government action.96
92. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Implicit in my argument is the idea that if
students are never logging on to complete their lessons, they are not receiving the instruction
that the government paid the school to deliver to them.
93. Schools could thus avoid FCA liability for enrollment fraud by implementing systems
to track how long and how often students are logging in. If the school finds that a student is
not logging in, they could avoid liability by taking reasonable steps to get the student to log in
and complete lessons. Alternatively, they could promptly notify the government that the stu-
dent has stopped attending.
94. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
95. Cf. McCann, supra note 91 (explaining how federal special education funds are dis-
tributed to avoid the overidentification of students with special needs). In fact, federal special
education funds are distributed in block grants to states based on the population of school-
aged children specifically to avoid incentivizing schools to overidentify students with special
needs. Id.
96. See Martin, supra note 43, at 236.
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Critics may argue that, even if it means a delay, legislators—not private
citizens playing attorneys general—should decide how and whether to regu-
late enrollment abuses. These skeptics will insist that charter schools and
their for-profit providers are running imperfect schools and businesses, not
defrauding the government.97 Yet, at its core, fraud is knowingly or recklessly
misrepresenting the nature of the service provided to receive federal funds.
And that is exactly the sort of behavior that these schools are engaging in.
More importantly, allowing bad businesses to fail is simply not an op-
tion when it comes to student achievement. With rare exceptions, students
only get one chance at each course.98 This is particularly true of students in
online schools, who are often on the brink of dropping out and who may
have exhausted all their other educational options.99 Waiting for legislators
to pass new laws will leave many students floundering in subpar schools for
the foreseeable future.100 Since an alternative strategy exists, this kind of de-
lay is unacceptable.
In addition, bringing FCA actions now does not foreclose employing
these other regulatory options later. Until new rules can be passed to regu-
late online charter school enrollment, FCA suits can serve as a needed stop-
gap. Even once new laws and regulations are passed, FCA suits can continue
to work in conjunction with these other regulatory measures. And since qui
tam suits do not strain prosecutors’ resources, there is no reason to worry
that these suits will divert resources from other efforts at regulation.101 Crit-
ics will argue that these suits will strain judicial, if not prosecutorial, re-
sources. But fraud’s higher pleading standard makes it more difficult for
shoddy claims to make it to discovery, which allows courts to screen out
nonmeritorious claims early enough in the process to avoid wasting judicial
time.102
97. Cf. Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, Carrots and Sticks: Placing Rewards as Well as
Punishment in Regulatory and Tort Law, 51 Harv. J. on Legis. 315, 339 (2014) (“Profit moti-
vated over-punishment is not the purpose of the FCA.”); Ryan Winkler, Note, The Civil False
Claims Act and Its Unreasonably Broad Scope of Liability: The Need for Real “Clarifications”
Following the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 533, 547 (2012)
(“[I]t appears that merely negligent defendants are now subject to liability under the amended
FCA.”).
98. Cf. Ctr. for Research on Educ. Outcomes, Stanford Univ., Online Charter
School Study 23 (2015), https://credo.stanford.edu/pdfs/Online%20Charter%20Study%20
Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/74M4-N5SA] (finding that students in online charter schools
lagged behind their peers in traditional schools in terms of academic achievement). In one
Stanford University study, researchers found that students in online charter schools made aca-
demic gains in math that translated to the gains that the researchers would have expected to
see if they had spent 180 fewer days—or an entire academic year—learning than their peers in
a brick-and-mortar classroom. Id. Likewise, online charter school students’ reading gains put
them 72 school days behind their peers in traditional schools. Id.
99. See Miron et al., supra note 22, at 30 (noting that some online schools cater to stu-
dents who are already on the brink of dropping out).
100. See Saul, supra note 16.
101. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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Exposing online charter schools to FCA liability might also lead those
within the education community to push harder for needed enrollment re-
forms. If these suits are successful, they could draw attention to the problem
and inspire legislators and administrative agencies to take notice.103 That
means that even if these suits are unpopular, they could still hasten attempts
to regulate online schools in other ways. Thus, bringing FCA actions would
serve to catalyze, not stymie, other regulatory actions.
Nevertheless, critics will argue that it is not the school’s fault alone if
students do not log in to complete their classes.104 And even if we assume
that schools shoulder the brunt of the responsibility for monitoring stu-
dents, failing to ensure that students are engaging with the curriculum is not
the same thing as committing fraud—it’s more like the school whose teach-
ers continue to teach while students snooze in the back of the classroom.105
These same critics will say that brick-and-mortar schools are not liable
for fraud when they collect funds for chronically truant students.106 The dif-
ference between the online schools and traditional ones, however, is that
brick-and-mortar schools are required to take attendance every day, often
every period, so state and local governments have a way to hold those
schools accountable if their students chronically do not attend.107 Addition-
ally, it is much harder for traditional brick-and-mortar schools to anticipate
that any individual student will not come to school. Since traditional schools
generally do not actively recruit students to come to their schools, they are
103. A similar thing happened in the context of for-profit colleges and universities. See
Doug Lederman, For-Profits and the False Claims Act, Inside Higher Ed (Aug. 15, 2011),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/08/15/new_round_of_false_claims_act_worries_
for_profit_colleges [https://perma.cc/8JN6-ZL64]; see also Gayland O. Hethcoat II, For-Profits
Under Fire: The False Claims Act as a Regulatory Check on the For-Profit Education Sector, 24
Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 1 (2011).
104. Cf. Marc Sternberg & Marc Holley, We Must Rethink Online Learning, Walton Fam.
Found. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://blog.waltonfamilyfoundation.org/2016/january/we-must-re-
think-online-learning [https://perma.cc/P43L-KK6Y] (“Virtual schools must help students
learn without requiring parents to be constantly present and monitoring progress. Parents, of
course, must be involved in their children’s education, but schools can’t abdicate their respon-
sibility in this equation.”).
105. As one critic of a proposed Ohio law that would have implemented stricter attend-
ance requirements for online schools argued traditional, brick-and-mortar schools can’t en-
sure that students are always engaged either. See Jim Siegel, Ex-Worker at Ohio Online School
Tells Legislators of Attendance Problems, Columbus Dispatch (May 8, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://
www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/05/08/debate-over-eschool-attendance-bill-con
tinues.html [https://perma.cc/RTG3-CD8P]. As he put it, “So you can’t daydream in class now
and let your mind wander?” Id.
106. Cf. id. (quoting a skeptical legislator who thought that lack of engagement is not the
same thing as fraud).
107. See, e.g., Jim Siegel, Ohio Legislature Might Delve into E-School Attendance, Columbus
Dispatch (Sept. 19, 2016, 12:01 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2016/09/
19/ohio-legislature-might-delve-into-e-school-attendance.html [https://perma.cc/WQP2-J6E4]
(noting that students at online schools can log in for just a minute each day to qualify for full
funding while a student at a traditional schools who showed up for one minute each day
would trigger the truancy system).
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not selling them on a new model. Because their model is the default, they do
not have to assess whether any additional student would be a good fit for
their school—they do not have any choice but to serve students regardless of
fit.
Online charter schools, on the other hand, seek out their students and
persuade parents that the model will work well for their children. As a result,
online charter schools are in a better position to decide whether any individ-
ual student is likely to succeed or fail at their school. In addition, because
particular types of students historically do poorly in an online learning envi-
ronment,108 online schools ought to have a sense of which students will not
do well before they enroll them in the first place.
The business model of online charter schools is built around enrolling
as many students as possible, including marginal students that they have
reason to believe will never log in.109 Because online charter schools, unlike
traditional schools, have incentives to enroll struggling students, regulators
should think differently about the responsibility online schools have to mon-
itor enrollment.110 Moreover, as one supporter of online charter schools put
it, online charter schools are still schools first and foremost, so they “can’t
abdicate their responsibility in this equation.”111
Qui tam suits also work well in the enrollment-fraud context because
damages are easy to calculate. There is a direct correspondence between each
student that a school enrolls and the amount of federal money that school
receives.112
The FCA is also a remedy that can theoretically work in any state across
the country.113 Even though K–12 education is largely regulated at the local
level, the fact that a school receives some federal money makes the FCA
108. See Saul, supra note 16 (commenting that online schooling “requires strong parental
commitment and self-motivated students”).
109. See id. (reporting that former officials of one online provider “say problems begin
with intense recruitment efforts that fail to filter out students who are not suited for the
program”).
110. Of course, the whole point of monitoring student enrollment is to ensure that stu-
dents are actually going to school—even when going to school just means logging into their
online program. And we care about whether students are going to school because we think if
they are not going to school they are not learning. Ideally, schools should not just make sure
that their online students are logging in, they should make sure that their students are learning
as well. A discussion of what responsibility schools have to monitor not just log-ins, but aca-
demic progress is beyond the scope of this Note. But expecting online providers to at the very
least ensure online students are logging in and showing up is an important first step toward
making sure that online students are receiving the education that they deserve and that the
state paid for.
111. Sternberg & Holley, supra note 104 (explaining the authors’—high-profile funders of
online charter schools—changed position on accountability for online charter schools).
112. See supra Part I for a discussion of school funding and enrollment.
113. Note, though, that some states have found in other contexts that charter schools are
entitled to sovereign immunity, which might make it more difficult for those courts to recog-
nize charter schools as appropriate defendants under the FCA. See supra note 84.
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applicable. 114 As a result, schools anywhere could be the subject of an FCA
suit regardless of what local or state laws say.
The FCA also has structures built into it that guard against too much
liability.115 Some educators will worry that using expanded theories of FCA
liability to target online charters will subject schools and educators to too
much civil liability. But once again, the high pleading standard that fraud
plaintiffs face guards against this.116 The heightened pleading standard com-
bined with the FCA’s own high requirements for pleading make it unlikely
that courts will actually hear a case unless there is a significant chance that
fraud occurred.117 And the fact that unsuccessful plaintiffs have to pay for
their own fees means that plaintiffs with marginal claims already have strong
incentives not to bring them.118 For all of these reasons, the FCA is not only
a viable but also a valuable tool available to plaintiffs and prosecutors to
regulate fraudulent enrollment practices employed by online charter schools.
Conclusion
Unless we act now, as online charter schools grow in popularity, in-
stances of enrollment fraud will grow as well. In the short-term, the FCA
and the expanded theories of liability pioneered in the health-care cases re-
present the best option for regulating online charter schools that exaggerate
enrollment and misuse public funds. Unlike the alternatives, FCA actions
have the potential to stem the growth of abuse and hold schools and their
for-profit providers liable for overenrolling and undereducating students.
Going forward, prosecutors and qui tam plaintiffs should use the FCA to sue
online charter schools that inflate or fail to reasonably monitor their enroll-
ment data. In doing so, they will be able to better ensure that tax money is
spent where it ought to be spent—on students.
114. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012). “Many, if not most,” public schools receive some federal
funds, generally in the form of special education money. See McCann supra note 91.
115. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
116. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
118. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
